

**UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO USFQ**

**Colegio de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades**

**European Colonialism in the Development of Democratic  
Institutions and Current Foreign Policy in Botswana and South  
Africa**

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# **UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO USFQ**

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## **HOJA DE CALIFICACIÓN DEL TRABAJO DE FIN DE CARRERA**

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Institutions and Current Foreign Policy in Botswana and South  
Africa**

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### **Abstract**

The purpose of this research paper is to analyze the divergence in political, social, and economic outcomes present in the cases of Botswana and South Africa via the framework of institutions and institutional change. In essence, this work, through the review and discussion of authoritative sources, will determine the effect and influence of European colonialism over the establishment of democratic systems and the formation of foreign policy objectives in the studied countries. Regarding contributions, this paper seeks to reveal further details on the dynamics of colonialism, the emergence of inclusive institutions, and the resilience of extractive institutions. In addition, this paper will briefly evaluate the validity of the propositions and examples of the reviewed literature, mention various pathways for further research, and provide guidance for the application of transformative public policy.

**Key words:** Botswana, South Africa, colonialism, inclusive institutions, extractive institutions, democracy, foreign policy

## Resumen

El propósito de este trabajo de investigación consiste en analizar la divergencia en los resultados políticos, sociales y económicos presentes en los casos de Botsuana y Sudáfrica mediante la teoría de las instituciones y el cambio institucional. En esencia, este trabajo, a partir de la revisión y discusión de fuentes pertinentes, determinará el efecto e influencia del colonialismo europeo sobre el establecimiento de sistemas democráticos y la formación de objetivos de política exterior en los países estudiados. En lo que concierne a contribuciones, esta investigación busca revelar mayores detalles acerca de las dinámicas del colonialismo, la aparición de instituciones inclusivas y la resiliencia de las instituciones extractivas.

Adicionalmente, este trabajo evaluará brevemente la validez de las proposiciones y ejemplos de la literatura, mencionará diversas propuestas para investigaciones subsecuentes y proveerá una guía para la aplicación de políticas públicas trascendentales.

**Palabras clave:** Botsuana, Sudáfrica, colonialismo, instituciones inclusivas, instituciones extractivas, democracia, política exterior

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## **Introduction**

Botswana and South Africa are two relevant cases in a comparative study of institutions and institutional change. These two countries have a common pre-colonial history, and their native ethnic compositions share various essential similarities. However, their experiences with European colonialism were significantly different, and their subsequent post-independence pathways were drastically divergent, with particular nuances in the current degree of inclusivity of their political, economic, and social structures, which foster or hinder broad participation from all members of society. Therefore, it is important to explore possible explanations for this divergence and to reveal some aspects in which foreign colonial disruption and domestic institutional creation are related. Consequently, the main objective of this paper is to answer the question of the effect of European colonialism on the formation of an internal democratic system and the definition of foreign policy objectives in the studied countries. Through the review and analysis of numerous pertinent sources on this question and its related sub-topics, this paper will explore and evaluate the assertion that historical colonial disruption fosters the emergence of extractive political and economic institutions after independence, which constrain the opportunities of various social sectors, and generate a highly unequal and dual society.

To provide an answer to the presented question, I will divide the research process of this paper into the following sections: First, I will present the relevant context required for a complete understanding of the historical and current situation of the studied countries, and I will justify the importance of analyzing these situations within the framework of institutions. Second, I will establish the general and auxiliary objectives and questions of this paper, which are connected to the three subtopics that I have defined for this research, namely, the differences in the colonial experiences of the studied countries, the effects of these experiences in the set-up of different democratic systems, and the influence of these

experiences in the creation of foreign policy. Third, I will reveal my positionality and reflect on its relevance in the implementation of this research and its limitations. Fourth, I will gather and state the diverse arrangement of academic sources that are pertinent for a complete answer to the research question and evaluate their propositions, examples, and validity. Finally, I will thoroughly discuss this literature and its implications, use this discussion to provide an answer to the research question, and succinctly state the conclusions obtained from this work.

With the realization of this paper, I intend to contribute to the general understanding of the dynamics of colonialism, democracy, and international relations. Specifically, I aim to reveal further details on the implementation and resilience of extractive institutions, whose consequences are not only relevant to the analysis of the studied countries but also to the discussion of other unequal societies in the Global South. In addition, I intend to evaluate the validity of the examples and propositions present in the cited literature, especially those that appear in the articles that compose the conceptual framework of this work. My purpose in this examination is to strengthen the framework of institutions and to generate a nuanced exposition of the interactions between colonialism and Indigenous societies. Finally, I will state various interesting pathways for further research, whose subsequent findings might be of importance for devising a sustainable public policy.

## Context

The context and justification sections of this paper will provide a description of the key aspects that are relevant to this research, particularly the political, historical, and economic elements that have influenced the current situation in Botswana and South Africa. In what follows, I will introduce the general characteristics of both countries, describe their precolonial and colonial histories, detail the nuances of their democratic institutions before and after independence, and recount their present foreign policy objectives and priorities.

Botswana is a landlocked country in Southern Africa that borders Zambia to the north, Namibia to the west and northwest, Zimbabwe to the east, and South Africa to the south. Although the country has a size comparable to Kenya or Madagascar, it is sparsely populated, with less than 2.7 million inhabitants. Its geography is dominated by the Kalahari Desert, with 84% of its territory composed by arid Kalahari sand and savanna vegetation, while its farmable land, which constitutes 4% of the total land area, surrounds the main urban settlements to the east of the country (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 9). Its capital is Gaborone, and other major cities include Francistown, Molepolole, and Maun. The ethnic<sup>1</sup> composition of the country includes eight major tribes,<sup>2</sup> collectively known as the Batswana, which are the Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato/Bangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana, and Batlokwa (Proctor 1968, 59). Its main languages are English and Setswana, and its currency is the Pula (BWP) (Government of Botswana). Its government is a democracy, with elections every five years, and has an Executive, a Legislative and a

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<sup>1</sup> The term “ethnic” relates to the concept of ethnic group, which in this work will refer to a community of people that share distinguishable social and cultural characteristics. “Ethnic conflict,” for example, constitutes a conflict between ethnic groups.

<sup>2</sup> According to Salzman’s (2020) definition, a tribe is a security organization that connects “local primary face-to-face groups” and is charged with the protection of its members, territory, and assets against outside intruders. A tribe usually has a “symbolic idiom,” and its leadership, when informal, takes the form of *primus inter pares*.

Judiciary as branches. Its legal system combines Roman-Dutch law with customary law (Ibid.).

The modern history of Botswana starts in the 1820s with the Mfecane, a period characterized by massive migrations that resulted in violent struggles for land, dominance, and survival (Eldredge 1992, 1). This upheaval was devastating for the Tswana peoples, who were weakened by the constant raids of the migrating tribes from the south (Ibid., 33). Although the Tswana were impoverished by the Mfecane conflicts, they progressively developed a political union. The Indigenous<sup>3</sup> tribes recovered by participating in the ivory trade, which allowed them to purchase guns, and Sechele of the Bakwena became the most powerful ruler of the land. In the 1840s and 1850s, Sechele faced a new crisis, as the Boers, Dutch settlers escaping British rule in South Africa, approached Tswana territory. The Boers blocked commerce between the Tswana and the British, demanded the disarmament and subjugation of the tribes, and requested the acceptance of a treaty, which, if signed, would have forced the Tswana to provide uncompensated labor (Ramsay 1991, 194). Sechele refused these demands, and by August 28, 1852, the Boers had invaded the settlement of Dimawe (Ibid., 196). The invaders achieved a pyrrhic victory, while the Batswana made an orderly retreat during the night (Ibid., 198). Later, Sechele organized retaliatory attacks against the Transvaal, the territory of the Boers, which resulted in an armistice in January 1853. The Boers recognized the Limpopo River as the frontier between the Transvaal and the Tswana territories (Ibid., 200), a decision that established part of the modern border between Botswana and South Africa. Another landmark moment of union between the Tswana came in 1895. The British, interested in blocking German South West Africa from the Transvaal,

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<sup>3</sup> The term “Indigenous” in this paper refers to those groups or entities whose origin precedes the formation of a colonial society. For example, “Indigenous languages” and “Indigenous peoples” are the languages and peoples that existed before colonialism. The term will appear capitalized throughout this work in recognition of its equal importance in comparison to other categorical names (British, Dutch, German, etc.). Indigenous is also the preferred term in comparison to “native” because the latter has a derogatory connotation in the studied countries.

established the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885 on the lands of the Tswana. Soon after, Cecil Rhodes lobbied intensively for the acquisition of the Protectorate by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) with the objective of expanding its mining enterprises in the area (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 12-13). The Tswana were against this development, and three chiefs, Khama III of the Bangwato, Bathoen I of the Bangwaketse, and Sebele I of the Bakwena, visited Queen Victoria to negotiate an end to the annexation (Ibid., 13). The chiefs, aided by the failure of the Jameson Raid, were successful in saving their land from resource exploitation.

The British administrative influence over the Protectorate was minimal, as the colonizers viewed the land as a mere “railway corridor to Rhodesia” and without any intrinsic value (Bunbury 1966, 536). Approximately 75% of the British expenditures were “administrative costs,” and the only colonial objective was to avoid the occupation of the land by rival European powers (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 13). Nonetheless, the British introduced a hut tax in 1899 and a “native tax” in 1919, with the aim of forcing the Batswana men to migrate to the Witwatersrand mines in South Africa for work (Ibid.). One important characteristic of the Tswana during this period was the organization of public forums, known as the *kgotla*, in which adult men discussed public policy and the chief heard court cases. This organization was a proto-democratic institution, as it allowed the commoners to openly criticize authority, a feature absent in the precolonial administration of other African nations<sup>4</sup> (Ibid., 9-10). Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, South Africa sought the transfer of the Protectorate to its jurisdiction; however, this union became

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<sup>4</sup> In this paper, a “nation” is the political configuration of a group and is usually characterized by defined territorial relations and a shared cultural identity regarding language and customs. Although “nation” and “tribe” share similar elements in their definitions, tribes are essentially dynamic and constitute a more specific grouping. For example, the previously separate Tswana tribes united politically to form the broad nation of Botswana. In general, the term will refer to the Batswana and the Zulu, who were major configurations of historical and political importance.

unfeasible when the South African government instituted *apartheid* in 1948, a repressive system of racial segregation (Ibid., 14).

The Protectorate achieved independence on September 30, 1966, and soon after changed its name to the Republic of Botswana. Its first leader was Seretse Khama, who was elected president after the 1965 Bechuanaland general election. His party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), achieved a sizeable majority in the National Assembly and continues to be the dominant political force in the country. The government of Khama (1965-1980) was essential to the political and economic progress of Botswana because of three main strategies. First, Khama was publicly supportive of Botswana becoming a member of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the precursor of the modern African Union (AU), an objective achieved shortly after independence (Khama 1970, 123). Inside the UN system, Botswana partnered strongly with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP). The partnership with the WFP was particularly crucial during the early years of the republic, as the organization helped avert famine during periods of severe drought (Lavrencic 1986, 52). Second, Khama started a process of institutional modernization, which included the continuous transfer of government competencies from the traditional chiefs into an emerging centralized state. This process included the creation of a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly, while the faculties of the chiefs were assigned to the House of Chiefs, an organ that has no influence in the creation of laws. This decision was surprising, as Khama renounced his status as heir of the powerful Bangwato tribe before becoming president. This modernization continued in the subsequent presidencies, and although it faced the opposition of the tribal regimes (Proctor 1968, 65), it has been described as a successful and nonviolent development in Botswana's history (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Finally, Khama's administration was effective in establishing optimal public-private partnerships and

using the gains acquired for the benefit of the citizenry. This was the case with the renegotiation in 1975 of the mining agreement with De Beers, now operating as Debswana, after the discovery of diamond reserves in the interior of the country. The new agreement gave the government a 50% share of the diamond profits (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 17), which were used to subsidize large-scale industrialization, develop a financial system, and invest in health and education (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 19). These circumstances transformed Botswana from one of the poorest countries in Africa at the time of independence to one of the most prosperous, with its 2022 value of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at current United States dollars (USD) reaching 7737.7, far higher than the Sub-Saharan African average of 1690.4 (World Bank a).

The general result of these policies is a stable country characterized by functional democratic institutions, continuous economic growth, the absence of political or ethnic infighting, and general citizen welfare. Regardless of Botswana's achievements, the country is facing emerging challenges related to the recovery from the AIDS pandemic, devising an economy post-diamond extraction, and reducing income inequality (Hillbom 2012, 477).

South Africa differs drastically in history, politics, economics, and general characteristics from Botswana. The southernmost country in Africa borders Namibia to the northwest, Botswana and Zimbabwe to the north, Mozambique and Eswatini to the northeast, and completely surrounds Lesotho. The country has a land surface area of 1220813 square kilometers, comparable to Colombia and Peru, and a population of 59.62 million (South African Government). The country has a diverse range of physical features, which include coastal wetlands, forests, grasslands, savanna, and deserts, but lacks commercially navigable rivers and natural lakes (Ibid.). The majority of the population is of Bantu-speaking<sup>5</sup> origin, a

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<sup>5</sup> The term "Bantu" can have a disrespectful connotation in the studied countries, and therefore, it will strictly refer to the broad ethnolinguistic group. When addressing the peoples of precolonial origin, "Indigenous" and "Black South Africans" are the preferred terms.

group that is subdivided into the Zulu, Xhosa, Basotho, Batswana, Swazi, Tsonga, and many other Indigenous communities. The country also has significant minorities of White South Africans,<sup>6</sup> “Coloureds” of multiracial ancestry, and Asians of Indian origin. South Africa currently has twelve official languages, with the most prominent ones being isiZulu, isiXhosa, Afrikaans, English, Sesotho, and Setswana, and its currency is the South African Rand (ZAR) (Ibid.). South Africa does not have a centralized capital: Pretoria serves as the seat of the executive branch, Cape Town is the seat of Parliament, Bloemfontein is the judicial capital, and Johannesburg is the site of the Constitutional Court (Ibid.). The government is a constitutional democracy and has a bicameral legislature, divided into the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (Ibid.).

The land was originally populated by the Khoisan and the San, which are Indigenous hunter-gatherers, and was gradually settled by the Bantu-speaking peoples as they expanded southward. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch gained an interest in the Cape of Good Hope as the maritime power of the Portuguese declined. The first colonial station was established in 1652 in Table Bay by Jan van Riebeeck, an administrator from the Dutch East India Company (VOC) (Plant 1961, 63). The Dutch expanded rapidly, and the Cape Colony increased in wealth by participating in the overseas trade and serving as a supply port for the voyages to Southeast Asia (Fourie 2013, 444-446). The colonizers also faced increased resistance from the Xhosa as they expanded eastward and faced them in multiple wars across the Great Fish River (Peires 1979, 61). The British seized the colony during the Napoleonic Wars to avoid its capture by the enemy French Republic. In 1819, after the wars, the British devised a facilitated emigration scheme to the Cape and rivaled the Dutch for control of the lands for the remainder of the century (Tosh 2014, 26). The Dutch farmers, known as the Boers,

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<sup>6</sup> While the term “Black South African” refers, in general, to South Africans of precolonial descent, “White South African” refers to those of European descent.

embarked from 1835 to 1838 on a journey to the interior of the country to escape British control in the Cape and establish self-government (Roos 1950, 35). The farmers succeeded after multiple conflicts with the Indigenous peoples and founded numerous states, with the Orange Free State (*Oranje-Vrijstaat*) and the Transvaal (*Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek*) being the most prominent of the Boer republics. This period of European rivalry and colonization coincided with the emergence of the Zulu Kingdom, which expanded under the military campaigns of King Shaka during the disruptions of the Mfecane (Eldredge 1992, 34-35). The British, concerned by the possibility of a unified Boer and Zulu uprising, defeated the latter in 1879 and annexed their kingdom in 1887 (O'Connor 2006, 303-304). Afterwards, the British conquered the Boer republics between 1899 and 1902, in a war characterized by severe land devastation and the death of Boer families in internment camps (Wessels 2016, 170-171). These wars ravaged the country and solidified a feeling of trauma and enmity between the British settlers, the impoverished Dutch "Afrikaners," and the deprived Indigenous peoples.

The British colonial history of South Africa was characterized by extractivism. A prominent figure of the era was Cecil Rhodes, who founded the BSAC and the diamond company De Beers, and whose area of business activity extended from the diamond reserves at Kimberley, in the northern Cape, to the mines of southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. The European settlers designed various mechanisms for the control of the Indigenous peoples during this period. Black South Africans, which constituted the labor force for the mineral extraction, were limited in movement by a system of internal passports, and their property was confined to the reservations established under the Natives Land Act of 1913 (Feinberg 1993, 68). Although these provisions were still decentralized during the period, they consolidated the basis for the institutionalized segregationist system of subsequent decades. South Africa became a single country in 1910 with the unification of the states of Transvaal, Orange Free State, Natal, and the Cape, and achieved complete sovereignty in 1931. The

country also included the territory of South West Africa, currently the independent state of Namibia, from 1915 to 1994.

The *apartheid* regime started in South Africa in 1948, after the victory of the Afrikaner National Party (*Nasionale Party*) over the pro-British United Party of statesman Jan Smuts in the general election of that year. The Afrikaner government institutionalized the informal system of discriminatory mechanisms against the Indigenous peoples, who were disenfranchised and deprived of the standard of living enjoyed by White South Africans. The *apartheid* government became a republic in 1961, after a referendum restricted to whites, and abandoned the Commonwealth of Nations that same year. After facing significant opposition within its borders and abroad, the regime devised the system of the Bantustans, which were reservations for the Indigenous peoples that were granted self-government and later “independence” (Kaur 1994, 43). This scheme confined Black South Africans, who composed around 74% of South Africa’s population, to zones that comprised less than 14% of the total land area of the country (Ibid.). In addition, the regime excluded all Indigenous languages from official status, reserved public jobs for Afrikaners, divided the black population along ethnic lines, and segregated the education system, among many other arbitrary impositions (Henrard 2003, 38). The *apartheid* system was gradually dismantled during the administration of Frederik Willem de Klerk, the last State President of the National Party, with the unbanning of the opposition African National Congress (ANC) and the release of activist Nelson Mandela, who was sentenced in 1963 to life imprisonment for the crime of sabotage (Harshe 1993, 1980).

The modern South African regime started with the 1994 general election, the first one under universal suffrage. The ANC was victorious, and Mandela became the first Indigenous president of the country. In that same year, South Africa prepared the pathway for a new constitution, returned to the Commonwealth of Nations, and released its last enclaves in

Namibia. However, reconciliation remains incomplete, and the post-apartheid situation has been tarnished by corruption and rising political violence (Armed Conflict Location 2023). In a similar case to Botswana, the country is also recovering from the consequences of the AIDS pandemic. The country is currently a member of the BRICS (with Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and bases its paradigms of development and political economy on the ideas of Pan-Africanism (Lumumba-Kasongo 2015, 92).

In 2022, South Africa had a GDP per capita (current USD) of 6776.5, lower than the value of Botswana, and its most recent Gini Index was 63 (with 0 indicating a perfectly equal wealth distribution and 100 a perfectly unequal distribution), which makes it the country with the highest income inequality on the planet (World Bank b). Furthermore, the country remains a site of ethnic tension and division.

These descriptions reveal significant and tangible contrasts and pose several dichotomies between Botswana and South Africa. Botswana has a small population composed almost entirely of Indigenous tribes that were united during crises and developed proto-democratic forms of government. Contrarily, South Africa has a sizeable population divided along ethnic lines and marked by a history of conflict for dominance. During the colonial period, Botswana was generally ignored by the British settlers, while South Africa was the site of numerous British mineral extraction projects. Throughout independence, Botswana established an inclusive political and economic system and modernized the state apparatus. In contrast, the Afrikaner minority of South Africa institutionalized a system of discriminatory and repressive measures against the black majority. Regarding international relations, Botswana relies on multilateralism and regional neutrality, whereas South Africa participates in the BRICS project. Finally, Botswana has a favorable macroeconomic situation in Africa, while South Africa is characterized by political violence and high income inequality.

These great differences between the two neighbors generate the necessity of creating comparisons and analyzing the reasons behind the disparities. In the next sections of this paper, I will detail the focus, scope, and theoretical framework that I will use for these comparisons. In addition, I will deeply explain the aforementioned divergences between the analyzed countries.

## Justification

The general purpose of this research paper is to explore and analyze possible relationships between three distinct components: the different patterns and strategies of European colonialism in Botswana and South Africa, the post-independence process of democratic institutionalism in the new states, and the current priorities and objectives of these countries in the international arena. This research is based on the perspective of institutional theory, which focuses on how the establishment of specific norms and organizational arrangements in a society guides the pathways of political, social, and economic processes thereafter.

The perspective of New Institutional Economics (NIE) provides the concepts of inclusive institutions and extractive institutions, which are necessary for the objective of this research. Inclusive economic and political institutions “are those that allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 89). In contrast, extractive economic and political institutions “are designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 91). A comparative analysis between Botswana and South Africa is considered pertinent under this conceptual framework, as their historical developments present crucial differences and similarities.

Botswana and South Africa are countries that have Bantu-speaking majorities in their populations. Both faced the colonial influence and endeavors of Dutch and British settlers, started processes of democratic institution-building, were severely affected by the AIDS pandemic, and presently form part of the African Union (AU), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). These countries

have a shared history but took drastically different trajectories, with consequences visible in their current situation.

The pre-independence history of Botswana was characterized by the general unity of the Tswana tribes against shared adversities. The tribes recovered from the tumultuous Mfecane, developed proto-democratic regimes with the *kgotla*, and formed a unified front against the Boer incursions. Their assertiveness, combined with the overarching geopolitical concerns of the British, who were persistent in countering their Germanic rivals in Africa, averted any extensive and extractive colonial regime on their lands. In contrast, the history of South Africa was affected by the conflicting relationships between the Bantu-speaking peoples during the Mfecane, the two competing models of colonization by the Dutch and the British, several wars of conquest among the Indigenous and the Europeans, and an economic system based on mineral extraction and the disenfranchisement of Black South Africans.

The post-independence history of Botswana was influenced by the decisions of Seretse Khama and the BDP, who were successful in modernizing the structure of the state, avoiding ethnic conflict, cooperating with the UN system to avert significant food insecurity, and using the income obtained from diamond extraction for the overall benefit of the citizenry. In contrast, the Afrikaner government of the National Party instituted *apartheid*, a regime that restricted the majority of the resources and wealth of the land to the minority of European descent. Botswana was affected by this development, as the country had tense relations with South Africa, whose government launched a raid in 1985 against suspected ANC guerrillas in Tswana territory (Lavrenic 1986, 51). South Africa's reconciliation started during the 1990s and remains incomplete today, especially after the present surge in political violence.

Finally, Botswana views itself as a “Switzerland of Southern Africa”: prosperous and separate from foreign struggles (Ibid.), but without rejecting the benefits of multilateralism. Meanwhile, the ANC-led government in South Africa partnered with the BRICS and based its objectives on the movement of Pan-Africanism. Although these antecedents may propose an overview of inclusivity in Botswana and extractivism in South Africa, there are certain details that add some degree of nuance. On the one hand, Botswana’s BDP has been in power since 1966, and some scholars have labeled the organization as paternalistic (Holm 1987, 24). On the other hand, Nelson Mandela’s presidency (1994-1999), guided by an ethos of reconciliation, human rights, and the pursuit of a free society, might constitute an antecedent of inclusivity in an otherwise fragmented and unequal South Africa (Mathews 2014, 38-39).

Via the use of the presented framework, this research seeks to explore the connections between the colonial past and the present democratic formation and international priorities of the analyzed countries, and to find the aspects by which current events in these countries are contingent on previous political, social, and economic arrangements. These findings will improve the present understanding of colonialism, democracy, and international relations as institutions.

## **Research Questions and Objectives**

This brief section establishes the central and auxiliary research questions and objectives that structure, guide, and delimit the scope and process of this paper. These questions and objectives also define the sections by which this work is divided and organized.

### *Main Question*

What was the effect of European colonial institutions on the historical democratic processes and present foreign policy objectives and priorities of Botswana and South Africa?

### *Auxiliary Questions*

What were the differences in the establishment of European colonial institutions in pre-independence Botswana and South Africa?

What was the effect of European colonial institutions on the democratic processes of post-independence Botswana and South Africa?

How have European colonial institutions influenced the current foreign policy objectives and priorities of Botswana and South Africa?

### *Main Objective*

To determine the effect of European colonialism on the historical establishment of democratic systems and the formation of foreign policy objectives and priorities in Botswana and South Africa.

### *Auxiliary Objectives*

To compare the processes of European colonialism in pre-independence Botswana and South Africa.

To determine the effect of European colonialism on the post-independence establishment of democratic systems in Botswana and South Africa.

To assess the influence of European colonialism on the formation of foreign policy in Botswana and South Africa.

## Positionality and Reflexivity

The research and analysis present in this paper do not happen in a vacuum, and they are constantly influenced by different degrees of subjectivity. Essentially, it is unfeasible for me to completely separate the production of this work from my own preferences, assumptions, and positions on the diverse topics and situations discussed. In fact, these personal affinities have a tangible effect on the different research decisions that I took, such as prioritizing certain topics over others, choosing a framework, selecting specific articles and books for review, and interpreting the author's arguments and data. In what follows, I will present the relevant aspects of my positionality and reflect on the ramifications of those aspects over the production process of this paper.

I am young, an Ecuadorian, and a man of *mestizo* (mixed) origin. Therefore, my concerns are shaped mainly by the current realities of this era, which are related to the climate crisis, the disruption of artificial intelligence, and the present international conflicts, with a focus on the effects of these circumstances on the situation of my country, Ecuador, and the region of Latin America. I was born and raised in Guayaquil, a city whose inequalities are physically evident, to the point that culture and idiosyncrasy change significantly between the neighborhoods and the *parroquias* (parishes) that compose the metropolitan area. I am currently finishing my tertiary education and recognize that my situation is different from the realities of the majority of the citizens of the country, which are more affected by the negative dynamics of malnutrition, informal work, crime, violence, lack of access to formal education and training, and segregation. However, being a *mestizo* also makes me different from the impressively diverse and fascinating worldviews of the other ethnicities that constitute the Ecuadorian nation.

I attribute high value to a political process based on reconciliation, consensus, and a measured approach, characteristics that are usually absent from the highly confrontational practices of Ecuadorian and Latin American politics. I consider that an appropriate political process for my country should address the structures of inequality that were established during the period of Spanish colonialism, ensure equality of opportunity for the different ethnicities of the land, and integrate the diversity of nations that coexist in its territory into a cohesive national society. Of critical value are the improvement of the educational system and the reduction of malnutrition, which are crucial steps for ensuring complete human development and realizing the human rights of the Ecuadorian citizenry. In essence, I believe that an institution of inclusivity precedes the attainment of sustainable growth and human progress in any society. Nonetheless, the perennial situation of institutional corruption in my country perpetrates the existence of the traditional architecture of exclusion and undermines the creation of necessary inclusive structures. These exposed principles, propositions, and experiences integrate the positionality that influences this work. In what follows, I will reflect on the tangible manifestations of my positionality in the research process of this paper.

Corlett and Mavin (2018) define reflexivity, an integral aspect of qualitative research, as a “self-monitoring” and “self-responding” process that questions the bases of the researcher’s interpretations and ways of doing things (377). In essence, reflexivity means the self-ponderation of ontology and axioms, epistemology and the nature of knowledge, and personal representations of truth, which can foster or hinder the understanding of social reality (Ibid., 379). Because I did not find significant mentions of this process in the literature that I reviewed, I consider pertinent to generate a reflexivity section to start the practice in this research area.

The selection of the framework of institutions for the analysis in this work stems not only from my affinity for the values of inclusivity and cohesion but also from the explanatory

strengths that I had identified in that approach when discussing the unequal societies of Africa and Latin America. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) devote a whole chapter in their book to the explanation of the faculties of their framework in comparison to other theories when discussing the “prominent patterns of world inequality” (111-138). Although I agree with their assertions, I admit that my acceptance also rests on the deterministic implications of the other theories and frameworks of thought. Culture and geography are two realities that change slowly and gradually, while elite ignorance is a random phenomenon based on the particular traits of national leaders. Therefore, theories that base their assumptions and explanations on these aspects are generally deterministic and remove importance from the capacities of non-elite agency. In contrast, institutions can be changed by different actors, evolve fast, and are defined by initially small and reversible junctures. Therefore, they are flexible as a means of explaining social phenomena and its economic and political ramifications. Especially important is the idea that, with a proper system of incentives, a cohesive society, and the establishment of political and economic structures under a banner of greater inclusivity and equality in access and opportunity, the positive effects of social well-being can emerge. I feel an affinity for that notion, having been raised in the unequal society that constitutes Ecuador.

Although the southern region of Africa (composed of Namibia, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, and South Africa) has divergent cultural identities from those of Latin America, the mentioned countries have comparable patterns of income and social inequality to those of my home region. The countries that integrate both regions are characterized by the dual-sector model of Arthur Lewis, in which a modern, urban, and developed sector coexists with a rural and deprived sector (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 302). In fact, the Gini Index values of South Africa and Botswana that I referenced in the context and review sections of this paper are strikingly similar to those found in Latin American countries. As I work with assumptions that focus more on organizational constraints rather than cultural worldviews, I consider that

processes of colonialism and democratic development in the southern African region can be applied to the discussion of Latin American political and economic dynamics. In addition, I consider that the social dualism of these societies can be reversed with the establishment of a system that constraints extractive behavior, particularly from the elite.

Olukotun et al. (2021) mention the importance of reflecting on biases and unearthing subjacent power dynamics that can marginalize research participants (1423). To provide completeness to my research and avoid a situation of one-sidedness when discussing historical phenomena, I gathered literature from different voices that focused on the specific nuances that are absent from the overview of Acemoglu et al. These articles analyze specific topics of Botswana and South Africa in a profound manner, and their conclusions have reinforced or criticized various of the assumptions and assertions that were made, particularly in the working paper of *An African Success Story: Botswana* (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Although I strongly agree with the general principles of the theory of Acemoglu et al., I felt that its usage of examples can be further improved with the addition of rigor and the detailed exploration of historical subtleties. I consider that this is an important procedure, as the literature of Acemoglu et al. is prevalent throughout studies of institutionalism and deserves constant revision and new evaluation. Nevertheless, my assortment of articles is not exhaustive due to the scope and limitations of this work. This paper is a short piece whose topics and research questions imply the selection of particular articles over others. Although this selection process is necessary for succinctness, the possibility of ignoring other relevant but unexplored facets of the presented junctures remains. In general, I am open to the inclusion of new voices in the discussion.

I am not Motswana or South African, and consequently, I cannot directly feel the realities that I present and analyze in this paper. This allows me to operate with the benefits of an external observer but also signifies that I do not have the direct experiences that could

improve my interpretation of the events and their aftermaths, especially when they are presented by the usually secondary sources of the reviewed literature. This reliance on secondary literature is per se a limitation, as my examination of Batswana and South African historical and political aspects was influenced by the filtering effect of the positionalities of the reviewed authors. In addition, I am not a speaker of the Indigenous languages of the studied countries, and therefore, my understanding of the different realities that were analyzed in this paper was shaped and transformed by the linguistic categories of English.

Consequently, my interpretation and evaluation of the traditional concepts of the Tswana and the Zulu will not include those profound nuances that are susceptible to translation, a situation that is especially noteworthy when considering that Setswana, Sesotho, and the Nguni languages have more native speakers than the Germanic languages in Botswana and South Africa. Nevertheless, I consider that the compatibility of experiences between the studied countries and my own permits a different and new analysis, based on my worldview as a young Ecuadorian. Naturally, I recommend to other interested researchers that they visit the land, interview the locals, and generate participant observation to derive more robust conclusions. These exposed ponderations constitute my reflection on my positionality and its effects on this work.

## Literature Review

This section constitutes the literature review for this paper. In what follows, I will provide a survey of the academic research relevant to my paper, identify the possible relationships between concepts, and define feasible pathways for new investigations. The general structure that I will use for this section is the following:

First, I will establish the framework that supports this research via the definition of general concepts and present some of the theoretical expansions proposed by the reviewed authors. Second, I will organize this survey under a thematic approach, based on the three subtopics that comprise the general purpose of this paper: the pre-independence institution of European colonialism in Botswana and South Africa, its effect on the post-independence democratic processes of these countries, and its influence in the formation of contemporary foreign policy objectives. For each of these subtopics, I will summarize the main ideas of the reviewed authors, briefly examine them, and relate them to the general framework. Finally, I will comment on the possible relationships that can be observed from the literature, identify the general ideas that can be extracted from the assertions of the reviewed authors, detail some of the discrepancies that emerge between the sources, and mention further research possibilities.

### *Conceptual Framework*

The study of institutions as precursors of political, social, and economic processes includes various concepts and propositions, enshrined in the perspective of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), that set up the framework for this paper. First, institutions “are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North 1991, 97). According to North, these constraints can be either informal, which pertain

to customs, traditions, and other mechanisms designed to induce certain patterns of social behavior, or formal, which encompass the rules present in the constitution, legal codes, and other agreements of binding character that are enforced by a society. North affirms that humans devise these constraints to reduce uncertainty during interaction by designing a system of expected conduct, and to create a structure of incentives that motivates cooperation, ensures commitment, and hinders the sporadic use of coercive force (Ibid., 97-101). The author asserts that these constraints evolve incrementally and that their history can be understood in a sequential pattern, particularly with the development of enforcement mechanisms. Regarding enforcement, the author states that as societies expand and complex exchange increases, a series of obligations becomes necessary to protect assets from their arbitrary seizure by the sovereign or other agents (Ibid., 100-101). When the state is effective in enforcing the rules, and the behavior of the government or the elite is restrained by these rules, then stability and technological advancement occur (Ibid., 109-111).

Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), in their book *Why Nations Fail*, use and expand North's framework of institutional constraints to explain the emergence of poverty and prosperity in numerous societies. The authors provide the concepts of inclusive and extractive institutions, whose definitions were introduced in the justification section of this paper and that can be summarized in the following terms: Inclusive institutions ensure the mass participation of members of society in activities that are appropriate to their skills. In contrast, extractive institutions extract wealth from a sector of society for the benefit of another sector, generally an elite (89-91). Politics establishes the institutions of society, which in turn, generate the incentives that drive poverty or prosperity in a nation. For the authors, political and economic institutions exhibit synergy and integrate feedback loops: when political and economic arrangements and historical events result in the creation of inclusive institutions, then a process of positive feedback emerges, named the "virtuous circle," that protects those

arrangements from subsequent efforts to undermine them (Ibid., 353). The authors exemplify this with the case of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which constrained the power of the British monarch. The Parliament of Great Britain, which supported the status quo after 1688, abided by the new system of the rule of law and defended institutions that favored innovation, such as property rights, incentives to trade, and patents (Ibid., 117-119, 351-354). In contrast, when arrangements and incidents generate extractive institutions, then a negative feedback loop, the “vicious circle,” emerges: those who benefit from the status quo are powerful and will attempt to stop any change that challenges their privileges, even if that change could improve the social and economic situation of society as a whole (Ibid., 122). According to Acemoglu and Robinson, the most pernicious manifestation of this circle is described in Robert Michels’s “iron law of oligarchy.” This theory states that an oligarchy, which can be defined as a “concentration of illegitimate power in the hands of an entrenched minority” (Leach 2005, 312), reproduces itself and endures regardless of which specific group of people is in control of government (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 408). For the authors, the process of decolonization was a critical historical juncture in which many post-independence governments replicated the abuses of their colonial predecessors, dissolved constraints, and undermined inclusivity in their societies (Ibid., 127). The institutional variations provoked by these junctures, if not reversed, eventually drift apart, becoming the disparities in outcomes of the current world.

Acemoglu and Robinson wrote a chapter on the role of colonialism, particularly the European sort, in the “vicious circle.” European expansion imposed or reinforced existing extractive institutions in the colonies, which terminated emerging commercial activity, strengthened absolutism, and curtailed the advantageous use of new technology (Ibid., 293). This statement is exemplified by the Dutch invasion of the Moluccas: The Dutch East India Company (VOC), to ensure a monopoly in the commerce of mace and nutmeg, massacred the

population of the Banda Islands and replaced the non-hierarchical governments of the Banda city-states with plantation systems. This had a ripple effect in Southeast Asia, as many other native kingdoms abandoned trade, fostered authoritarianism, and embraced autarchy in the hope of avoiding direct confrontation with the Dutch (Ibid., 291-292). This historical juncture condemned the region to underdevelopment.

### *European Colonialism in Pre-Independence Botswana and South Africa*

As stated in the context section of this paper, the colonial history of Botswana and South Africa was characterized by multiple conflicts, different strategies of domination, and divergent institutional trajectories. Because of its geographical isolation, the southern region of Africa was spared from the destructive conflicts that were provoked by the Atlantic slave trade (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 303). The first European incursions, which started with the first VOC settlement in 1652, were initially of limited scope and did not interact directly with the Bantu-speaking groups. The Mfecane of the 1820s, however, started a period of turmoil for the region, defined by widespread migration and exacerbated conflict between the Indigenous peoples. Although Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's (2001) brief description of the era posits the Zulu expansion under King Shaka as the main initiator (11), Eldredge (1992) argues that the period has more nuance and that its causes deserve a reconsideration (1). For the author, the turmoil of the Mfecane does not have a "monocausal explanation" and that the "myth of Zulu culpability" was used by the *apartheid* regime to label Black South Africans as "inherently divisive and militaristic" (Ibid., 2). Eldredge, in her article, describes the increasing encroachment of the Europeans in the region: slave traders established a base in Delagoa Bay, in modern Mozambique, and frontier settlers in the northern Cape Colony supplied wars of enslavement among the Indigenous groups (Ibid., 1-2). These methods were

the same as those applied in western and central Africa, which were based on the funding of conflict between the native kingdoms to obtain slaves, usually prisoners of war, for the Atlantic market (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 294-298). However, the Portuguese slave trade in Delagoa Bay was insignificant before 1823, particularly in comparison to the high activity of the ports of Quelimane and Moçambique (island), and therefore it is insufficient as a reason for the general turmoil of the era (Eldredge 1992, 8-15). Other theories argued that the groups' inefficient usage of the land and the subsequent famine prompted the tribes to expand militarily (Ibid., 26-27). Eldredge rejects this argument on the grounds that the Zulu were careful in ensuring the regeneration of the land, but agrees with dendroclimatology analyses that reveal sustained droughts throughout the period (Ibid., 27-29). The drought motivated competition between groups for fertile lands, and these conflicts, which generated resources for the chiefs, consolidated the power of the elites in a process of further social stratification (Ibid., 30-31). According to the author, the complex juncture of European agency, trade, drought, and African competition proposes the emergence of absolutist and expansionist leaders, such as Shaka, as a consequence rather than a cause of the Mfecane.

The history of the Batswana during the period of the Mfecane is peculiar. The Tswana were uprooted from their lands by the Griqua, a tribe funded by European frontier farmers. This group, which is an amalgamation of numerous Bantu-speaking tribes in the Kalahari Desert, eventually united under Sechele of the Bakwena and defended their land from colonial exploitation in the famous events of Dimawe (1852) and the visit of the three *dikgosi* (chiefs) to Queen Victoria (1895) (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 11). Even more important than the Tswana's affinity for union and cohesion was their practice of certain proto-democratic institutions, which were reunited in the *kgotla*, a feature specific to their tribal organization and absent in other comparable Bantu-speaking groups in Lesotho and South Africa (Ibid., 10). Contrary to the public assemblies of the Nguni and the Tsonga, which

convened only for relevant ceremonial occasions, the *kgotla* was held regularly by ordinary tribesmen and constituted a source of consultation for the *kgosi* (chief) on public affairs (Ibid.). Particularly surprising is that the installation of a new *kgosi* was realized during a *kgotla* (Morapedi 2005, 175-176), a tangible evidence of the importance of the institution. However, the *kgotla* was completely distant from any definition of a free democratic experiment. Women and *balata*, the overarching term for the “minor” tribes of non-Setswana origin, were barred from attendance, and the deliberations of the assembly were legally non-binding on the actions of the *kgosi* (Mompoti and Prinsen 2000, 628-630). Nonetheless, the institution was remarkable when compared to the strict hierarchical structure of other African nations, such as the Zulu in South Africa.

Before the discovery of mineral wealth in the region, the British interest in South Africa was exclusively strategic: to unify the dispersed Boer and Indigenous nations and turn the land into a bastion for the protection of the route to India (O’Connor 2006, 287). According to O’Connor (2006), the British wars of conquest in the region were not due to assessed economic benefits but rather the result of colonial rivalry between the European powers (287-291). Henry Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner for Southern Africa between 1877 and 1880, launched wars against the Zulu (1879) and the Dutch Boers (1880-1881) to protect the British project of a South African confederation against internal rebellion and the possibilities of Russian encroachment (Ibid., 303-304). Similarly, the creation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885 was a rather reluctant British initiative that had the sole purpose of avoiding the seizure of Botswana by their Portuguese, German, and Dutch Afrikaner rivals (Morapedi 2005, 177). Concerning the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, which dissolved the independent Afrikaner republics of the region, André Wessels (2016) concludes that its aftermath of alienation and trauma marked a feeling of animosity, which contributed

to Afrikaner support for the segregation policies that composed the *apartheid* regime (170-172).

The colonial institution of the Europeans and the disenfranchisement of the Indigenous peoples of South Africa did not follow the sequential pattern stated by Douglass North. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) mention that, during the last quarter of the 1800s, the tribesmen of the Xhosa and the Zulu took advantage of the increased demand for food caused by the European expansions and rivalries. The ordinary Indigenous people of the Ciskei and the Transkei developed an affluent agricultural industry, whose prosperity worked to the detriment of the traditional chiefs, who saw their monopoly on the land and their absolutist control of society gradually dissolved (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 305-308). However, the incipient inclusive institutions of this period were abruptly terminated when the British, aided by the segregationist objectives of the Afrikaners, wanted to create reservoirs of cheap labor for the extraction of the recently discovered mineral wealth of the land (Ibid., 308-309). In their effort to impoverish the Indigenous and coerce them into working for the mines, the colonizers devised various systems that would later integrate the *apartheid* regime. Numerous scholars, including Feinberg (1993), assert that the Natives Land Act of 1913 was the most visible manifestation of the burgeoning segregationist policies of the late colonial era (65). The act created a “Schedule of Native Areas,” which included all African reserves established before 1913, and carefully defined the boundaries of the areas, whose total acreage amounted to just over 7% of South African territory (Ibid., 68). In addition, the act prohibited Africans to “buy, lease, or in any other manner acquire land outside a scheduled area, except by acquiring that land from another African” (Ibid.). Europeans could not buy or lease land from an African, and only Africans could purchase land within the scheduled reserves. Finally, the act declared that sharecropping and agricultural squatting by Africans were illegal in the Orange Free State (Ibid., 69). Essentially, the act confined the ownership rights of Black

South Africans, the vast majority of the population, to only 7% of the country. As expected, the results were disastrous: the small reserves became overcrowded, and their agriculture quickly failed due to overgrazing. White Afrikaner farmers benefitted from the abrupt lack of competition, and the impoverished Indigenous peoples, who were stripped of any significant source of income, were forced to offer their labor cheaply in the European-controlled mines (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 309-311). The system eventually developed political ramifications. The Dutch Afrikaner became staunch defenders of their supremacy in the Transvaal and the Free State (Feinberg 1993, 85) and would formalize the *apartheid* regime in 1948. Meanwhile, the traditional chiefs, whose powers were previously in decline, saw their absolutist regimes restored (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 311). Botswana, whose arid land and (at that point) undiscovered mineral wealth made the country unattractive to the Europeans, was spared to some degree of the blatant expropriation inflicted against Indigenous South Africans. However, the limited British administration was successful in driving a substantial portion of Batswana into working in the South African Witwatersrand mines via the system of taxes described in the context section of this paper (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 13). The aforementioned regimes became the foundation of the post-independence systems of the studied countries.

*European Colonialism in the Post-Independence Establishment of Democratic Systems in Botswana and South Africa*

Botswana and South Africa shared important initial similarities during the period of colonization, as their Indigenous populations faced the Mfecane, the encroachment of British and Boer-Afrikaner explorers, and the subsequent intervention of the Europeans on their lands. However, crucial differences in the organization of their tribes, the extent of war and colonization in their countries, and the types of institutions that were created, as defined in the

previous sub-section of this paper, generated drastically different post-independence developments.

The Botswana system of the *bogosi* (chieftainship) and the practice of the *kgotla* survived the period of the Bechuanaland Protectorate (1885-1966), despite various efforts by the British to undermine them. The metropole appointed a Resident Commissioner in Mafeking to legislate for the protectorate, but could only do so by respecting the “native laws and customs of Batswana” (Morapedi 2005, 177). Morapedi narrates some interesting episodes of this era: the abuse of power of some *dikgosi* during colonialism, the attempts of the British to turn the *dikgosi* into mere civil servants in the 1930s, and the successful resistance of the chiefs, who recovered part of their independence in the 1940s (Ibid., 182-184). This institutional competition between the Resident Commissioner and the *dikgosi* possibly resulted in Botswana’s modern legal system, which combines Indigenous customary law with Roman-Dutch law.

In the context and justification sections of this paper, I introduced the three essential decisions of Seretse Khama’s administration after independence in 1966, namely, the open support for international multilateralism, the implementation of a process of institutional modernization, and the use of optimal public-private partnerships for the benefit of the citizenry. More pertinent for this section is to present the considerations of some scholars and observers on the effects of these junctures. J. Harris Proctor commented in 1968, just a few years after independence, that Khama’s government found a solution to the dilemma of constitutional modernization by transferring the faculties of the *dikgosi* to the democratic organizations of the district councils and the new unicameral Parliament (59). However, this was not a straightforward solution. The modern politicians of the Lobatse constitutional talks of 1963 noticed the importance of preserving *bogosi* for national stability but could not accept the inclusion of the *dikgosi* as members of an upper house in a bicameral legislature, as it

could impede the necessary process of modernization (Ibid., 62). Therefore, the compromise was to create the purely advisory council of the “House of Chiefs,” whose apparent benefits were twofold: it accommodated the traditional *dikgosi* into the new system but also isolated them from the confrontational practice of modern politics (Ibid., 63). Morapedi (2005) argues that the flexibility of *bogosi* for reform has ensured its resilience in the new democratic system, especially with the consideration of the *dikgosi* as “custodians of customary law” and their role in ensuring law and order in the rural villages (191-195). For their part, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) assert that the transfer of property rights of sub-soil diamonds from the *dikgosi* to the government was “crucial in the construction of the state” (16) because it averted “tribal cleavages” and “greater conflict among tribes” on the control of mineral wealth (Ibid., 25).

In the context section of this work, I described the origin and implementation of the *apartheid* regime of South Africa (1948-1994), as well as the importance of Nelson Mandela for post-apartheid systemic change. Therefore, I consider pertinent the analysis, from a scholarly perspective, of the development of the process of reconciliation. Kristin Henrard (2003) affirms that reconciliation involves not only “telling the truth” but also reparation and the “restoration of a spirit of respect for human rights and democracy” (37). The author mentions the agreement between the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) for a two-stage drafting process for the new constitution, the granting of amnesty for politically motivated offenses during the *apartheid* regime, and the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to organize the necessary efforts of public truth-telling (Ibid., 39-40). The constitutional negotiations agreed to various principles and norms that the author considers crucial for reconciliation, namely, the adoption of affirmative action mechanisms to counter *apartheid*'s “divide-and-rule” policy, the recognition of nine Indigenous languages as official, the equalization in access to education as a response to

*apartheid*'s "separate-but-unequal" schools, the self-determination of cultural communities, and the restoration of dispossessed land rights for the Indigenous, this last point being particularly contentious between the ANC and the white parties (Ibid., 41-47). Although Henrard emphasizes the importance of compromise and balance during the constitutional discussions, she asserts that the implementation phase of reconciliation was "very slow and often highly deficient" (Ibid., 47). The author names numerous setbacks, which include the insufficient work of the TRC, the controversial implementation of affirmative action to the detriment of the Indian population of South Africa, the lack of financial aid for the racial transformation of schools, and the proliferation of land invasions, which hamper the remediation of property rights, among other hazards to the post-apartheid process. (Ibid., 41, 48-49). Van der Spuy and Shearing (2014), who wrote after 20 years of incomplete reconciliation, reveal that the process has not only been hindered by its initial setbacks but also by the deviation of subsequent ANC governments from the scope of various of Mandela's policies (199). A prime example is the ANC's shift in 2000 from the National Crime Prevention Strategy of the 1990s, focused on human security and a "holistic societal response," to a combative approach more akin to a "shoot to kill" policy (Ibid.). Today, South Africa remains one of the most violent countries on the planet.

I briefly wrote in the justification section that promptly identifying Botswana as "inclusive" and South Africa as "extractive" under Acemoglu's framework is simplistic and that the current situation offers some degree of nuance. Apart from the accusations of political paternalism made against the government of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), Ellen Hillbom mentions the contemporary challenges facing the country. Hillbom (2012) outright discredits the assertions of some scholars, who believe that Botswana is a developmental state similar to the prominent East Asian models, because Botswana is still characterized by natural resource dependency, incomplete industrialization, a lack of a strong private sector, and the

connection between the bureaucracy and the “cattle-keeping elite” (67). The author states that Botswana’s current structure continues to resemble that of a *gate-keeping state*, a model developed by historian Frederick Cooper to identify those colonial systems that promoted limited growth and development based on the production and export of only one or two primary goods (Ibid., 72). Surprisingly, Hillbom argues that Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s argument on Botswana’s current situation is a contradiction, as the country is far from “inclusive”: it has a national Gini Index of 54, which indicates high income inequality, its rural poverty prevails, and its beef industry is under the control of large cattle holders, usually the traditional *dikgosi* and their relatives (Ibid., 82-83). Regardless of Khama’s inspiration in modern, mainly British, influences, the BDP conserves strong ties to the rural and traditional elites (Ibid., 86-88), and the result of that connection is a dual and unequal society.

#### *European Colonialism in the Formation of Foreign Policy in Botswana and South Africa*

This final sub-section constitutes a brief overview of the underlying frameworks behind the divergent behavior of the studied countries in the international arena: on one side, the regional neutrality and multilateralism of Botswana; on the other side, South Africa’s current affinity for Pan-Africanism.

Gilbert A. Sekgoma (1990) states in his article the four national principles of Botswana, namely, “democracy, development, unity, and self-reliance” (152), which guide the foreign policy of the country. The implementation of Botswana’s international strategy, for its part, has been prudent, adaptive, and cautious due to the nation’s historical economic dependence on South Africa and Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe), which were politically hostile during their *apartheid* regimes (Ibid.). Regardless of a practice of cautiousness and a

policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, Botswana did not acquiesce to the pressures of the *apartheid* states. In fact, Botswana clearly signaled to the international community that it despised the *apartheid* system, supported the independence of Namibia (under South African control), rejected economic assistance from South Africa, and gave asylum to the dissidents of the *apartheid* states (Ibid., 153-154). In addition, Botswana obtained the support of the Western states and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for its accession to the United Nations (UN), joined the African Union (AU) (at that time the Organization of African Unity), and led the project of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to counter South Africa's economic dominance in the region (Ibid., 154-158). In the present day, Botswana seeks to strengthen its economic activities in the SADC, with tourism becoming especially attractive as a means for diversification (Harvey 2015, 3-4).

The global political economy is dynamic and faces the emergence of new markets and agents from the Global South. The BRICS, an acronym for the group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, have a growing share of the global GDP and are increasingly assertive against the economic system that was devised by the old industrial powers (Lumumba-Kasongo 2015, 79). Lumumba-Kasongo (2015) analyzes this new juncture under the framework of social constructivism and Immanuel Wallerstein's world system theory, with a special focus on the redefinition of agreed social values (81). For the author, the South-South agenda supports a multipolar approach to development, amicable to communitarianism, "social welfarism," and ecological concerns – a paradigm shift from the orthodox development programs proposed by Western institutions (Ibid., 82-84). In addition, Lumumba-Kasongo believes that South Africa should consolidate the BRICS agenda into the present African political debates, especially considering the compatibility of the group with the prospects of "Pan-African governance" (Ibid., 87, 92). Finally, the author considers that

the BRICS should undergo a process of democratization for it to be truly beneficial for emerging African states (Ibid., 92).

### *Commentary on Relationships*

The contribution of this paper to the presented literature constitutes the organization of different and unconnected perspectives as well as the discussion of diverse historical and current junctures within the conceptual framework of institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson expand upon North's framework and support their assertions through the use of numerous historical and contemporary examples. In addition, their illustration of the origin of *apartheid* in South Africa as an abrupt and drastic institutional change challenges North's assertion about the rather incremental and gradual evolution of institutions. Nonetheless, their works present the historical junctures of Botswana and South Africa in a simplistic manner, which ignores the profound nuances of events and realities such as the Mfecane, the specific characteristics of the *kgotla* and its competition with British structures, the aftermath and implications of the Anglo-Zulu War and the Anglo-Boer Wars, or the specific clauses of the Natives Land Act of 1913. I consider that the discussion of the papers of Eldredge, Mompoti and Prinsen, Morapedi, O'Connor, Wessels, and Feinberg is conducive to a more complete analysis of the relationships between the colonial past and the post-independence situation of Botswana and South Africa. In general, the literature provides evidence for the influence of colonialism in the "vicious circle" of extractive institutions.

The literature review on the post-independence development of Botswana and South Africa reveals the adoption of institutions whose inclusivity remains incomplete and in which pre-independence extractive structures endure. Henrard identifies as positive the predisposition of South Africa's political parties for compromise and balance but criticizes the

inefficiencies of the reconciliation process during Nelson Mandela's administration. Van der Spuy and Shearing, more than ten years after the publication of Henrard's article, identify additional complications to the South African process, particularly with the ANC's shift from a measured approach to a more combative stance. For its part, Botswana's case evidences a contradiction. Although Proctor and Morapedi described how Botswana's "new elite" of professional politicians strengthened the state apparatus against the traditional *bogosi*, Hillbom mentions that the *dikgosi* continue to be influential in the beef industry and other major economic sectors of the country. More notably, Hillbom criticizes Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's consideration of Botswana as an inclusive country. Although Hillbom agrees with the general framework of inclusivity and mentions Botswana's good macroeconomic and political performance, she makes the crucial assertion that the country is a *gate-keeping state* as long as its rural poverty and high income inequality endure. Although Botswana's Gini value of 54 is not as high as South Africa's 63, it reveals a society that remains dual, that is, one in which extraction and dispossession remain. Finally, the foreign policy strategies of both countries experienced a shift after the end of *apartheid*. During South Africa's *apartheid* regime, the country abandoned the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961 and became isolationist due to international pressures against its segregationist system; after 1994, the ANC-led government embraced Pan-Africanism, which guides its relationships today. Likewise, Botswana's strategy focused on multilateralism and institution-building, with the creation of the SADC, to counter *apartheid* hostility; after 1994, the BDP-led government continued a foreign policy that is now unburdened by external pressures.

This review reveals multiple pathways for interesting research. First, considering the discrepancies between North and Acemoglu et al., further studies should analyze the conditions in which institutional change is gradual or abrupt. Second, Wessels's proposition on the resulting enmity between the peoples of South Africa after the colonial wars as a cause

for *apartheid* remains unexplored, and new studies should research the qualitative importance of animosity and tension in the creation of political structures. Third, Hillbom's critique reveals deficiencies in the usage of examples by Acemoglu et al. Therefore, further research should examine the historical cases that were referenced and revise their fit in the framework of institutions. Fourth, there is scant reference to Botswana's foreign policy after 1994 and South Africa's international strategy during *apartheid*, which generates incompleteness in the historical foreign policy analysis of both countries. Finally, the literature ignores the complete dimension of women and gender. Of great importance is analyzing this dimension in the junctures of the Mfecane, the colonial situation, the post-independence developments, and the current circumstances of the studied countries.

## Discussion

The objective of this section is to analyze and discuss the previously reviewed literature to provide answers to the research questions that were developed in this paper. In what follows, I will examine and reflect on the different theoretical approaches and propositions made by the authors present in the literature review and address the three auxiliary questions that were defined, namely, the differences between the European colonial institutions in Botswana and South Africa, the effect of those institutions in the democratic processes of the studied countries after independence, and the influence of colonialism in the formulation of foreign policy objectives. After this assessment, I will proceed to give a general answer to the main research question of this work. To ensure completeness, I will also discuss the relationships that exist between this answer and the framework of African Postcolonial Theory.

Concerning the overarching framework of institutions and their effects on political, economic, and social outcomes, the book of Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) expands upon the concepts introduced by North (1991), an author who defined institutions as systems of formal and informal constraints that motivate cooperation and commitment (97-101). However, both pieces of literature diverge in the overall quality of institutional change, with North defining the phenomenon as sequential and incremental, and Acemoglu and Robinson providing numerous examples throughout their publication of rather fast and drastic changes, particularly with the events that surround the establishment of colonialism and its practices in various societies of the Global South. In general, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) affirm that colonialism abruptly curtails the spontaneous and gradual emergence of inclusive and open institutions by implementing, usually by force, an extractive system more favorable to the geostrategic and economic interests of the metropole (291-293). This extractive system impedes the development of an open democratic structure in the colonized society, whose

economic apparatus becomes reliant on the export of few primary goods, and hinders commerce and exchange in the international arena. When independence occurs, the extractive and exclusive structures of the formerly colonized society endure, and a dual-sector model, characterized by the coexistence of both a wealthy and a deprived sector of society, becomes apparent. Although the evidence provided in the literature is not conducive to a conclusion on the general quality of change, the examples of colonial coercion given by Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) support their assertion on the fast evolution of institutional modifications.

*On the Differences between the European Colonial Institutions of Pre-Independence Botswana and South Africa*

The analysis of the critical differences between the European colonial institutions established in both countries requires a thorough comparison of the similar and divergent historical junctures lived by the Batswana and South African nations. This comparison starts with the Mfecane, which constitutes the origin of the formation of the modern states that were devised by the Europeans in the southern region of Africa. Eldredge (1992) states that the emergence of this period of turmoil was not monocausal and asserts that the initiators of the conflict include the nascent disruption of the institution of slavery by the Europeans as well as tribal competition for land and resources during a prolonged drought (2-31). Important for the author is to discredit what she terms the “myth of Zulu culpability,” which was employed by the *apartheid* regime to justify the segregation of the Indigenous peoples (Ibid., 2). The diffusion of this myth by the regime and the subsequent treatment of the events of the era possess important implications. On the one hand, the formulation of this myth during *apartheid* signifies an effort from that government to undermine Black South Africans by arbitrarily labeling them as “divisive and militaristic” and distorting the developments of their history. On the other hand, the treatment that various authors gave to the period, which

focused on a limited assortment of explanations, usually focused on Zulu expansionism, diminishes the pivotal and complex role of African agency in the era, represented by the diverse interactions of interest and competition among the numerous burgeoning tribes and leaders of the region.

The developments of the Indigenous peoples of Botswana and South Africa diverged after the conclusion of the Mfecane and the evident differences in the extent of European intervention on their lands. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) mention the nascent unification of the tribes of Tswana origin during subsequent crises and the survival of the *kgotla* as a distinguishable institution of open participation, at least in comparison to the hierarchical and absolutist tribal structures of other Bantu-speaking groups (10-11). Nonetheless, their propositions on the functions of the *kgotla* lack a more profound revision of its subjacent characteristics. Mompati and Prinsen (2000) state some of the non-inclusive practices of the assembly, such as the prohibition of attendance for *balata* and women, and the non-binding character of its resolutions. The situation of *balata* and women is particularly relevant, as it poses numerous questions on whether the inclusiveness of Botswana's democratic system was limited to the major Tswana tribes and not expanded to the situation of women and minorities.

The Bechuanaland Protectorate of 1885, established in the modern territory of Botswana, has been labeled by the literature as a "reluctant" initiative from the British, focused exclusively on deterring Portuguese and German expansion in the region (Morapedi 2005, 177). In contrast, South Africa was initially perceived as a land of high strategic value for the colonizers, particularly in its role as a supply depot for the maritime route to India, and therefore was the site of numerous wars of conquest fought between the European colonizers and the Indigenous peoples (O'Connor 2006, 286-304). The British administrators were persistent in strengthening their control of the territory, and they utilized coercive means for

that objective at the expense of more moderate political approaches. A particularly unexplored reading of this historical juncture was exposed by Wessels (2016), who asserted that the numerous wars of expansion and the colonial rivalry between the British and the Dutch Afrikaners generated a feeling of enmity and alienation among the ethnic groups of South Africa, which motivated the adoption of repressive and extractive measures during the *apartheid* regime (170-172). This is an important proposition, as the political situation of South Africa after the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) was marked by the competition between pro-British and Afrikaner interests. In addition, the Afrikaners were especially anxious to strengthen their position against increasing economic competition from the Indigenous peoples, who entered a period of agricultural prosperity during the last quarter of the 1800s (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 305-308).

Colonial intervention in Botswana was minimal and left a minor influence in the political, economic, and social configurations of the land, at least in comparison to more apparent systems of exploitation in the region. Although the British forced the migration of Batswana to the South African mines as a work force (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 13), their limited administration faced the enduring resistance of the Indigenous organizations of the *bogosi* and the *kgotla* (Morapedi 2005, 177-184), with the Tswana chiefs being especially resolute in conserving their political privileges and freedoms. In contrast, the extractive colonial institution of South Africa was immensely more evident and explicit. The discovery of mineral reserves on the land by British explorers and the agricultural competition between the Indigenous and the Afrikaners, with the latter impoverished by the aftermath of the Second Anglo-Boer War, fostered the cursory introduction of repressive measures against Black South Africans and their possibilities for social and economic well-being. The Natives Land Act of 1913 constituted a start for the consolidation of these measures in the national legal code, and the Schedule of Native Areas defined the islands of poverty and dispossession

that were inhabited by the disenfranchised peoples of South Africa (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, 309-311).

Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) mention that small and punctual historical junctures can result in great disparities in outcomes. The Indigenous ethnic groups of Botswana and South Africa share in their history the turmoil of the Mfecane, but the manner in which each country emerged from the period prompted the different trajectories of European colonialism that have been discussed. The Tswana tribes were politically unified after that era, and the *dikgosi* countered numerous attempts of domination and exploitation by the Europeans. This union, in combination with the general unattractiveness of their land, provided a negative incentive for any profound colonial project by the Europeans. The Dutch Boers were halted militarily in their invasion attempt at Dimawe. The British, for their part, were unable to completely replace the institutions of *bogosi* and *kgotla* with structures more akin to their economic interests. The survival of the *kgotla*, regardless of its shortcomings as an inclusive organization, ensured the development of proto-democratic values among the Batswana. However, the pre-independence system of the Indigenous nation excluded *balata* and women, who did not benefit from the inclusivity of the political union. In contrast, the numerous Bantu-speaking groups of South Africa competed against each other during the Mfecane, with some of them, such as the Griqua, collaborating with the European colonizers. These peoples did not develop nor protect practices similar to the *kgotla*, were more hierarchical in comparison to the Batswana, and were not unified against increasing European encroachment. The British, moved by geostrategic calculations, launched several offensives against the Zulu and the Dutch Boers, their major rivals in their objective to subdue the land. The Anglo-Boer wars scarred the country and marked the subsequent enmity between pro-British and Afrikaner forces in the political process. Unexpectedly, Indigenous farmers benefitted from the increase in demand for agricultural products, but their prosperity was short-lived, as the

Europeans abruptly implemented a repressive and segregationist system in their attempt to coerce the Indigenous inhabitants into becoming a cheap source of labor. This system constituted the *apartheid* regime and established an explicitly abusive institution for the benefit of White South Africans and at the expense of Indigenous livelihoods. Meanwhile, the hierarchical and absolutist structures of the South African chiefs were restored, as ordinary tribesmen and tribeswomen were stripped of their former agency and free enterprise. This colonial process evidences that the generation of a dual society is not necessarily spontaneous and follows the decisions made by a changing elite. Finally, in contrast to the emerging but incomplete inclusivity of Botswana, any inclusive institutions that appeared in the colonial era of South Africa did not endure.

*On the Effect of European Colonialism on the Post-Independence Democratic Processes of Botswana and South Africa*

The post-independence process in Botswana evidences gradual inclusivity but remains incomplete, particularly with the prevalence of old and less inclusive structures. Because the European colonial project on the land had a limited scope and influence on the Indigenous population, its role in the post-independence process is confined to the facet of soft power, particularly related to the British education and ideas of modernization held by Seretse Khama, the leader of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and architect of the modern Botswana state. Khama's project pursued the creation of a state apparatus based on the Westminster parliamentary system that absorbed the executive and administrative faculties previously held by the *dikgosi*. In essence, Khama and his group of politicians desired to avoid ethnic infighting over the natural resource wealth of the country by nullifying the legislative input of the traditional chiefs. However, this transfer could not be complete nor abrupt, as the *dikgosi* were deemed vital for national stability and internal governance during

the Lobatse constitutional talks (Proctor 1968, 62). Therefore, the BDP perceived the importance of conserving *bogosi* as the spiritual custodian of customary law, essential in the legal configuration of the state, and as the arbiter of the affairs of the rural villages.

Particularly more important was Khama's pragmatic objective to gather political support from both urban and rural citizens, with the latter being predominant in the agrarian economy of the country at independence. This objective, combined with the evident necessity of the BDP to secure the votes of the rural settlements, ensured the survival of *bogosi*, an institution that has evolved and changed in accordance with the developments of the political arena (Morapedi 2005, 191-195). In general, these developments demonstrate a rather complex relationship between the BDP and *bogosi*, motivated by the conflicting objectives of attaining institutional modernization, maintaining traditional political support in a democratic system, and securing stability between the urban and rural sectors of the country.

The complex relationship between *bogosi* and the BDP generates current social and economic ramifications in the country. Although the *dikgosi* lost their legislative powers in the modern state, Hillbom (2012) denounces their enduring control of various economic sectors, particularly the beef industry and other clusters related to agrarian production (82-83). This author exposes the resilience of the "cattle-keeping elite" in a country that remains a *gate-keeping state*, characterized by an undiversified economy. Furthermore, the country evidences stark inequality, particularly with its treatment of women and the ethnicities of the minor tribes. This situation poses numerous questions about the possibilities for further economic advancement and social well-being in Botswana. Although the country achieved impressive growth on the basis of various sensible decisions, its unequal social configuration and its economic model reliant on the mining industry may constitute challenges for further and permanent progress, especially in an era in which sustainability is increasing in importance among leadership circles. Another relevant point is to consider the structures of

*bogosi* and their role as inclusive or extractive institutions. Although the Tswana chieftainship was remarkably inclusive during the colonial period when compared to the absolutist regimes of other Indigenous nations in the region, its openness is incomplete, especially in a current era in which women and minorities are developing a more assertive position in the political process. This reality shows that inclusivity as a concept and as a label evolves with time, and formerly inclusive institutions may become extractive if they do not reform. In addition, the labels of “inclusive” and “extractive” do not follow a rigid dichotomy and are better used when considered as two extremes of a continuum.

In contrast to Botswana’s case, South Africa’s post-independence process has been evidently exclusive and specifically related to historical European disruption. On the basis of the analyzed literature, the *apartheid* regime was the constitutional and formal continuation of the previously decentralized colonial system, which was characterized by institutionalized abuse and segregation against the Indigenous peoples. This regime was also the result of political and economic calculations, motivated by the grueling aftermath of the multiple wars of conquest of the 1800s. The true post-independence and proto-democratic development of South Africa starts with the end of the *apartheid* regime and had a brief window of inclusivity during Nelson Mandela’s presidency (1994-1999), which was tasked with the gargantuan endeavor of national reconciliation.

If post-apartheid reconciliation is defined by Henrard’s (2003) concept of “telling the truth,” reparation, and the restoration of human rights and democracy (37), then its realization is an inconclusive process. In essence, the rapid dissolution of the resilient and extractive structures of *apartheid*, including its “divide-and-rule” policy, its “separate-but-unequal” education program, and its confinement of Indigenous property rights to small reservations, was notoriously difficult, regardless of the atmosphere of compromise between the political forces of the country prior to 1994. The process faced multiple setbacks, such as the lack of

funding for the reformation of the education system or the emergence of land invasions during the restoration of property rights. Furthermore, the nuances of enduring ethnic division and exclusion became apparent in the post-apartheid project, exemplified by the fact that the new affirmative action policies, originally devised to ensure equality of opportunity among the peoples of South Africa, were not beneficial to the populations of Asian origin (Ibid., 48-49). This development evidences the multiple ethnic divides in the South African population, which include the colonial rivalry between the British and the Dutch settlers, the historical competition between the Indigenous peoples, and the exclusion and lack of political presence of the minorities of Asian origin. These ethnic divides are a significant factor in the permanence of a dual society more unequal to that of Botswana, when considering Gini Index values, and constitute an additional challenge for the attainment of permanent reconciliation. Moreover, the nuances of the post-apartheid political configuration pose doubts over the continuation of Mandela's overarching principles of balance and compromise, especially given the deviation of the African National Congress (ANC), in power since 1994, to a more confrontational stance. This shift in values is evidenced by the change in national policy on crime and security from a holistic approach to a more punitive program in the 2000s (Van der Spuy and Shearing 2014, 199). However, there is another aspect, less discussed in academic literature due to its recentness, of the deviation of the South African government from the reconciliation process: the endemic corruption of the ANC. The presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009-2018) was tarnished by multiple corruption scandals related to embezzlement of public funds and the abuse of "cadre employment," a system that places party militants into positions of power and that has been viewed as outright cronyism (Epstein 2015, 11). This situation has hindered the ANC's capacity to provide public services to impoverished communities, which has motivated an increase in political protest and violence (Besseling 2016, 3). In addition, the rise of Zuma as an electoral liability strengthened the power of the Democratic Alliance

(DA), its traditional opposition, and fostered the creation of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) by dissidents of the ANC.

To conclude this sub-section, European colonialism was unable to implement permanent extractive institutions in Botswana due to its limited administrative efforts and the strong union of the Tswana tribes against foreign encroachment. Instead, European notions of institutional modernity were part of Seretse Khama's vision of an inclusive and democratic nation on the African continent, a project that generated undisputed and impressive growth and social progress for a once poor agrarian country. However, the entrenched influence of the *dikgosi* in various industrial sectors, as well as the unequal situation of women and minorities, pose challenges for further inclusivity and sustainable economic growth. In contrast, European colonialism was ubiquitous in South Africa's *apartheid* regime, and its dismantling has followed a tortuous and incomplete process, historically challenged by resilient ethnic division and now threatened by the surge of political violence and corruption. With the advent of new general elections in both countries in 2024, compounded by a consistent decrease in political support for the BDP and the ANC, questions emerge concerning the possibilities of further accountability in the studied governments and therefore, on the plausible rise of inclusivity in the future.

*On the Influence of European Colonialism on the Formation of Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities in Botswana and South Africa*

Contrary to the relationship between colonialism and internal political processes, which was related to specific historical junctures and varied widely in strength between the studied states, the determination of European colonial influence in Botswana and South African foreign policy is straightforward and revolves around the behavior of both countries during and after *apartheid*.

From 1966 to 1994, Botswana was surrounded by hostile white-minority governments, and therefore its foreign policy strategy was based mainly on dissolving its previous economic dependence on its troublesome neighbors and countering subsequent foreign encroachment on its lands (Sekgoma 1990, 152). The country employed multiple visible measures, which included supporting Namibian independence, formerly part of *apartheid* South Africa, providing asylum to dissidents of *apartheid*, and even becoming a member of the anti-apartheid Frontline States (FLS). In general, the Botswana state, which started independence as an exclusively agrarian economy, pursued the development of national industries and established a model of wealth creation separate from the influence of the Rand Monetary Area, historically controlled by South Africa. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish this assertive regional strategy from its international variant, which had multilateralism and neutrality as focal points. Botswana openly supported the projects of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth of Nations, and the United Nations, particularly as a means to gather legitimacy and international support for its regional strategy of economic self-reliance. However, the country, due to its limited resources and position, implemented this strategy in a prudent manner, and although it pursued amicable relationships with the Western nations, it joined the bloc of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), possibly to remain neutral in contentious and partisan foreign issues. The multilateral component of this international strategy was highly beneficial for the country, especially in the assessment of critical health issues and food insecurity on the eve of independence. Since 1994, Botswana's strategy has shifted its focus to strengthening its economic partnerships in the region as well as maintaining its agreement with the De Beers in the crucial sector of diamond extraction.

South Africa, due to its momentous political transition in 1994, evidences a more drastic shift in foreign policy objectives in comparison to Botswana. The *apartheid* regime of

South Africa, formally constituted by the most explicit measures of colonial exploitation, was essentially isolationist. The United Kingdom opposed the transfer of the coveted BLS territories (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) to South African jurisdiction after the rise to power of the regime but maintained economic ties with the country. South Africa then left the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961, became a republic after a referendum restricted to white citizens, and its government was increasingly targeted by anti-apartheid activists within its borders and abroad. These phenomena can be interpreted as an extension of the internal political changes that occurred in the country, especially with the emergence of the National Party (NP) as a representation of the Afrikaner, a group highly concerned with maintaining its position and status after the trauma of the Second Anglo-Boer War.

The shift in objectives and strategy after 1994 was substantial and closely related to the ANC's affinity with the Pan-African movement. Mandela's administration returned South Africa to the Commonwealth and agreed to the independence of its last holdings in Namibia in 1994. Moreover, the presidency embraced the international agenda on human rights, a concept that was persistently rejected by the previous *apartheid* regime. However, the end of Mandela's presidency in the 2000s marked the start of further variations in South African foreign policy, especially with the change in values of the governing ANC. Jacob Zuma fostered and attained the inclusion of South Africa into the BRICS group, under the argument that the association's support for a South-South agenda and its advocacy for a non-Western financial and economic system align appropriately with the principles of Pan-Africanism, a movement concerned with Indigenous governance and the rejection of imperialism (Lumumba-Kasongo 2015, 82-84). This current foreign policy direction will guide South Africa as long as the ANC stays in power, particularly in an increasingly multipolar international arena.

*On the Effect of European Colonial Institutions on the Historical Democratic Processes and Present Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities of Botswana and South Africa*

The reviewed literature and its discussion reveal various dynamics between European colonialism and the subsequent institutional processes of the studied countries, particularly in regard to directions of change that might reveal further inclusivity or extractivism. Because the answer to the main research question of this paper diverges when analyzing the cases of Botswana and South Africa, I will divide my final response into two succinct paragraphs.

In general, foreign European colonialism was minimal in Botswana, at least in comparison to the historical developments of other countries in the region, and therefore its effect is tangible but not completely explanatory of the major institutional changes that the country underwent after independence. The Tswana nation exhibits several antecedents of union and resistance against major attempts at foreign disruption, and its pre-independence leaders were effective in preserving the legitimacy and power of the traditional institutions via the means of warfare, negotiation, and judicial assertiveness. Therefore, there was no attempt by the Europeans to establish and consolidate an entrenched elite inside Botswana society, with the first democratic president of the country, Seretse Khama, being the former heir of the powerful Bangwato tribe. In addition, Khama's specific and individual decision to modernize the state under the Westminster model came about due to his British education and was not a product of foreign coercion or encroachment. This becomes apparent in the historical foreign policy of the country, which was visibly opposed to *apartheid* but embraced neutrality and non-alignment on other issues of international scope. In consideration of both Botswana's overall economic success and the less thriving trajectories of its neighbors in the region, I assert that the lack of a significant colonial regime constitutes a positive juncture, as it allows a native society to develop unburdened by the explicit exploitation of foreign extractive regimes and institutions. More importantly, Botswana's situation of incomplete inclusivity is

due to the successful preservation of ancestral Indigenous organizations and not to the arbitrary and abrupt decisions of an occupying power. Finally, Botswana's gradual pathway for further inclusivity should focus on increasing participation from historically ignored women and *balata* in the political arena and in the national economic sectors, a situation that will foster democratic governance, ensure sustainable economic progress, and improve social well-being.

The case of South Africa evidences a stark contrast to the historical process of Botswana, and the developments of the country are deeply related to the colonial origins of *apartheid*, the consolidation of the repressive regime, and its aftermath of unending national reconciliation. The post-Mfecane period of South Africa was characterized by successive European wars of conquest, a lasting rivalry between two models of colonization, and the implementation of a system devised to halt the economic advancement of Indigenous peoples and coerce them into becoming cheap labor for extractive commercial endeavors. This system was consolidated by the change of political leadership in 1948, with a government that was particularly concerned with preserving the social and economic status of its group, motivated by a widespread feeling of ethnic enmity after the colonial wars, and at the expense of the Indigenous inhabitants of the land. What followed was the enforced creation of a dual society, with wealthy and burgeoning white citizens on one side and dispossessed, impoverished, and disenfranchised black citizens on the other. This regime was extensive in time, its effects on society were vast, and its gradual dismantling proved a grueling, challenging, and Sisyphean process. The subsequent national reconciliation, which started under Mandela's values of compromise and balance, is being stopped by the recent faults of the current government, which has been marred by corruption, cronyism, violence, and failure to attend to the necessities of the poverty-stricken sectors of society. I consider that the political system requires further accountability and improved strategic scope to re-instate the uninterminated

process of reconciliation and eventually end the “vicious circle” of resilient, extractive, and colonial institutions.

*On the Relationship between the Findings of Institutional Theory and Other Theories of European Colonialism in Africa*

Although the main scope of this paper was to use the conceptual framework of institutions to compare and analyze the contrasting characteristics of Botswana and South Africa, I will also discuss the possible relationships that emerge between the presented findings and the perspectives of African Postcolonial Theory. I consider that this final assessment is advantageous for two major reasons: First, to determine the common ground that exists between the propositions of this paper and alternative, more reflectivist approaches; and second, to define the position of this work’s contributions in the positivist-reflectivist debate and in the general theoretical structure that has researched the studied region. Moreover, this assessment will focus on the realities of South Africa, as its enduring colonial regime, drastically more powerful and resilient than the one of Botswana, makes the country a focal point for African decolonial and postcolonial thought.

The critical theories of South Africa converge on the “paradigm of difference,” in essence, the notion that the *apartheid* regime instituted a separate system in knowledge and education with the objective of provoking an internalization of asymmetrical hierarchy and inferiority in the Indigenous communities (Pillay 2021, 410). This paradigm establishes a contrast between the application of decolonial thought in Africa and the Latin American decolonial school, which has been focused on the dimensions of enforced cultural assimilation (Ibid., 390). One of the major concerns of these theoretical approaches resides in the concept of decoloniality, which constitutes the process of “epistemic reconstitution,” based on revalidating the Indigenous views, theories, systems, and values that have been

systematically suppressed by dominant colonial rhetoric and ways of thinking (Ibid., 394). Furthermore, this process seeks to address the “epistemicides, genocides, usurpations, appropriations, and disruptions” that occurred during the several colonial epochs present in the Global South (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, 13).

I consider that the findings of institutional theory and the research interests of critical perspectives constitute two complementary approaches to the study of colonialism and its effects in the southern region of Africa. In essence, the colonial process had several enduring dimensions in South African society, and therefore it should not be assessed exclusively under a monocausal overview. In general, the critical and reflectivist perspectives analyze the epistemic phenomena of oppression and division, while the findings of this work focus more on the political and economic materializations of these phenomena as precursors of extractive institutions. In addition, the resilience of the organization and tangible effects of the “vicious circle,” especially with the maintenance of a dual society, regardless of regime change in South Africa, could be examined not only under the notion of socially undesirable incentives or as a failure in the system of humanly-devised constraints but also by the framework of educational and knowledge systems of exploitation, particularly during the “separate-but-unequal” education program of *apartheid*. Finally, the postcolonial idea of “ontological pluralism” could be interpreted as an inclusive institution, as it seeks to rediscover and revalidate the systems of thought that were excluded during colonialism and its current ramifications.

## Conclusion

The main purpose of this work consisted of the analysis of the divergent historical developments of Botswana and South Africa under the framework of institutions, the usage of this analysis for the exploration of the relationship between colonialism and post-independence structural processes, and the implementation of that exploration and discussion for the generation of a final assessment on the nature of inclusivity and extractivism in the studied countries. In addition, this paper also performed the functions of testing the validity of some historical examples that were used as evidence in the reviewed literature, comparing the different and tangible manifestations of the utilized framework in the studied countries, and determining suitable pathways for further research.

In general, the exploration of institutional changes as the abrupt realizations of arbitrary decisions and fortuitous historical junctures constituted an appropriate frame of reference for the discussion of the trajectories of Botswana and South Africa, two countries that share a similar ethnic origin but whose political, economic, and social directions are drastically divergent. This divergence was not the result of a spontaneous and gradual process, but rather the outcome of a series of definite decisions and conscious interventions by a wide variety of agents.

One of the essential ideas that were generated by this work is that Botswana is characterized by institutions whose inclusivity, defined as the complete political, economic, and social participation of all members of society, remains incomplete due to the resilience of traditional structures, which, regardless of their proto-inclusivity in previous centuries, remain evidently exclusive under the values of the current era. The other essential idea asserts that South African society was afflicted by the turmoil of colonial conflict, the consolidation of extractive institutions, and the present political difficulties in dismantling the “vicious circle,”

which is characterized by the resilience of arbitrary structures devised to extract wealth from one subset of society for the benefit of another subset and that generate an evidently dual social configuration. The possibilities for attaining further inclusivity, necessary for the achievement of sustainable growth and well-being, rely on the capacities of the democratic systems of both countries in implementing critical reforms.

I consider that this paper makes a contribution to the general theory of institutions due to various reasons. First, the cases of Botswana and South Africa are similar to other societies of the Global South in what concerns a dual structure of social configuration. The qualitative experiences of both countries are comparable to those lived by other nations that underwent foreign colonial regimes, and their data, particularly their Gini Index values, coincides with the quantitative information of other highly unequal societies, especially in Latin America. Therefore, I believe that the findings of this paper can be useful for the analysis of the post-independence realities of other developing countries, particularly when complemented with the epistemic examination performed by critical and reflectivist approaches. Second, this paper, via the examination and discussion of the validity of various examples and theories from the literature, provides a nuanced examination of institutional inclusivity in the studied countries and proposes the notion of treating inclusive and extractive institutions as the extremes of a continuum, contingent on the evolving definitions of open participation. Third, this work analyzed various dimensions of colonialism, its dynamics within Indigenous societies, and its influence as an initiator and perpetrator of specific structures of governance and control. Finally, the pertinent discussion of the studied cases, with their complex successes and shortcomings, could serve as a basis for the ideation and implementation of a public policy appropriate for sustainable models of social transformation.

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